

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01

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P R 261857Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1766

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1717

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY MEETING,

26 FEBRUARY 1974

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY: MBFR PLENARY MEETING TOOK PLACE  
ON 26 FEBRUARY 1974 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF  
BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSEN, AND HEARD A STATEMENT  
FROM GDR REP OESER. OESER ASSERTED THAT LACK OF  
PROGRESS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR WAS NOT  
THE FAULT OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. SINCE  
THE WESTERN STATES HAD CLEARLY DEPARTED FROM THE  
PRINCIPLES AGREED ON IN THE 28 JUNE 1973 COMMUNIQUE.  
OESER ASSERTED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL CONTINUED TO

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CONTRIBUTE TO THE ARMAMENTS RACE BECAUSE IT EXCLUDED

ALL BUT THE US ARMED FORCES FROM THE INITIAL REDUCTION MEASURES. OESER SAID THAT THE INTENT OF NATO TO EXCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR CAPABLE UNITS FROM THE REDUCTION PROCESS ONLY INCREASES THE FEARS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES THAT THE WEST IS INTERESTED IN INCREASING AND NOT IN REDUCING THE STRENGTHS OF THESE UNITS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE PARTICIPATING SOCIALIST STATES HAVE REPEATEDLY AND VERY CONCRETELY STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS AND READINESS HERE TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CORRESPONDS TO THEIR BASIC APPROACH TO COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERING SOCIAL ORDERS, AND TO THE FURTHERING OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE IN EUROPE. AS IS THE CASE WITH THE OTHER SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, THE DELEGATION OF THE GDR VIEWS THE STATUS OF POLITICAL DETENTE ACHIEVED IN EUROPE AS A POSITIVE PRECONDITION AND AS A CHALLENGE FOR US TO OBTAIN RESULTS IN VIENNA. IT STARTS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT PRACTICAL STEPS FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A DAMMING UP OF THE ARMS RACE IN THE EUROPEAN AREA, AND COULD START THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT. THAT SERVES THE GENERAL AIM OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AGREED TO BY ALL, NAMELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MORE STABLE RELATIONS AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IF, UP TO NOW, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THAT WE HAVE COME CLOSE TO THIS AIM IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS NOT THE FAULT OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

2. ON NOVEMBER 8, 1973, THEY TABLED A PROPOSAL IN THE FORM OF A DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS. IT ENCOMPASSES IN A FAIR MANNER THE EXISTING FOREIGN AND NATIONAL GROUND AND AIR FORCES, EXCLUSIVELY UNITS WITH ATOMIC ARMS, FROM THE START, AND IN EACH OF THE PHASES DURING THE ENVISAGED IMPLEMENTATION. THE PROPOSAL OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST PARTICIPATING STATES THUS DEALS WITH THE AGREED SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973: "MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS..." BY "POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT WITH REFERENCE TO CENTRAL EUROPE", AS MENTIONED IN THE PROTOCOL OF MAY 14, 1973. WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED UNEQUIVOCALLY HERE, THAT TAKING INTO CONSIDER-

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ATION THIS STIPULATION OF THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE AND OF THE PROTOCOL MENTIONED CORRESPONDS "IN EVERY WAY AND AT ALL TIMES" TO THE THEREIN STIPULATED PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE UN-DIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. HENCE THE DEVIATING ATTITUDE BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES FROM THESE BASIC POINTS OF DEPARTURE, WHICH ALSO FOUND ITS

REFLECTION IN THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 28, 1973, HAS SO FAR BLOCKED THE WAY TO ACHIEVING PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SINGLING OUT OF INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF NATO-STATE FORCES, AND THEIR PROPOSALS FOR WHAT IS IN EFFECT A ONE-SIDED REDUCTION BY THE SOCIALIST STATES, ARE CLEARLY AIMED AT THE GAINING OF MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR NATO. BY EXCLUDING LARGE FORCES COMPONENTS EITHER COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY FOR AN UNLIMITED TIME PERIOD, THEY FURTHER THE CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION OF THE ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN A DANGEROUS WAY. FOR THAT REASON, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS CAN THEREFORE NOT CONTRIBUTE IN ANY WAY TO MORE STABLE RELATIONS AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

4. WE SUPPORT UNDEVIATELY THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AN AGREEMENT ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATION OF MAKING AN INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

5. WHAT, FOR INSTANCE, PREVENTS THE WEST EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA FROM AGREEING TO THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES AND CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 2 OF THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT, TO PARTICIPATE IN A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN 1975. WHAT IS SO COMPLEX OR COMPLICATED ABOUT THIS. A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS WOULD BE VIEWED BY US AS AN HONEST CONTRIBUTION DURING THE SEARCH FOR CONCRETE POINTS OF AGREEMENT, WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE AGREEMENTS WE REACHED IN 1973. WE SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVIATING FROM ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS BY OUR GOVERNMENTS, AND TO CONSTRUCT IN THEIR PLACE GENERAL AGREEMENTS WHICH THEN SERVE FOR DEDUCING UNFOUNDED THESES, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE HERE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SO FAR NOT REPLIED TO OUR REPEATED QUESTIONS ABOUT A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SIX WESTERN STATES WHICH, IN ADDITION TO THE U.S., ARE POTENTIAL PARTNERS IN AN AGREEMENT. NOT ONE OF THESE SIX STATES HAS SO FAR

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DECLARED WHEN AND IN WHAT DIMENSION IT WILL PARTICIPATE WITH MILITARY UNITS IN THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THE WESTERN FRAMEWORK PROPOSALS TALK ONLY VAGUELY ABOUT THE INTENDED PARTICIPATION OF "OTHER" WESTERN STATES IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. THIS INCREASES THE JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR QUESTION ABOUT CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION BY THE SIX STATES. HOW ARE WE TO UNDERSTAND WESTERN EXPLANATIONS MADE IN THE CONFERENCE CITY, THAT ONLY A "SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND U.S. TROOPS/ IS BEING ENVISAGED, AND WITH RESPECT TO THE SETTLING OF OTHER QUESTIONS, MENTION IS MADE OF AN UNDERTAKING WHICH "...WILL BE EXPERIENCED BY A GENERATION WHICH HAS NOT YET EVEN BEEN TRAINED". (THIS IS AN ALLUSION TO COMMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL IN HIS TALKS AND AT A PRESS CONFERENCE DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO VIENNA.)

6. THERE WAS ALSO NO REFERENCE TO THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES  
OF WEST EUROPEAN STATES IN THE PRESENTATION OF AMBASSADOR BEHRENS  
DURING THE LAST PLENARY, ON FEBRUARY 21. AND WE WOULD HAVE EX-  
PECTED FROM HIM IN PARTICULAR THAT HE WOULD ADDRESS THE QUESTION  
ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE BUNDESWEHR WILL PARTICIPATE IN THESE  
REDUCTIONS, AND WHEN THIS REDUCTION IS TO COMMENCE. THE REASON  
FOR PUTTING THIS QUESTION SO CONCRETELY IS THE FACT THAT WE DE-  
DUCED FROM THE MOST RECENTLY PUBLISHED FRG WHITE BOOK, THAT FOR  
EXAMPLE THE NUMBER OF BUNDESWEHR BRIGADES IS TO BE INCREASED FROM  
33 TO 36, AND THAT ACTUAL PEACETIME FORCES STRENGTH IS TO REACH  
622,000 MEN.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01

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H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 DRC-01 /165 W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1767

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 1717

E.O. 11652: GDS

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26 FEBRUARY 1974

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

7. BY HERE ADDRESSING THE GDR BUNDESWEHR IN PARTICULAR BECAUSE OF ITS CONTINUING INCREASE, IS IS NOT INTENDED TO LEAVE ASIDE THE FORCES OF THE OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES. GREAT BRITAIN, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS IN PARTICULAR ALSO MAINTAIN UNITS WITH GREAT COMBAT CAPABILITY, EQUIPPED WITH THE MOST MODERN ARMS AND COMBAT TECHNIQUES, IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE FRG, UNITS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR COMBINED NATO ACTIONS, AND WHICH FOR THAT REASON ARE FIRMLY INCORPORATED IN THE OPERATIVE NATO FORMATIONS IN THE AREA OF

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REDUCTIONS. THEIR INCLUSION IN AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THEREFORE REQUIRED FROM THE OUTSET IN THE INTEREST OF THE AIM OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. ON JANUARY 31, 1974, AMBASSADOR ROSE SPOKE HERE ABOUT THE RISK RESULTING FROM THE PRESENCE OF LARGE MILITARY GROUPINGS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BUT HE GAVE US NO CONCRETE EXPLANATION ON HOW GREAT BRITAIN IN-

TENDS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A REDUCTION OF THIS RISK WITH AN APPROPRIATE REDUCTION OF THE BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE, BEING A PART OF THE WESTERN GROUPING.

8. IN THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE REDUCTION OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST BE CERTAIN THAT THE OTHER PARTNERS ARE CONSTRUCTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE SOLUTION OF A COMPLICATED TASK, AND THAT THEY ARE NOT DELAYING IT IN ORDER TO CREATE A FAITE ACCOMPLI OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE ROOM WHICH WORKS AGAINST THE AIMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE MUST ALSO INCLUDE THE AIR FORCES, AND PARTICULARLY UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS, IF IT IS TO CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO THE STABILIZATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, AND IF IT SI TO WORK AGAINST THE ARMS RACE.

10. AS IS GENERALLY KNOWN, AND ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL REPORTS, 7,000 U.S. ATOMIC WAR HEADS ARE STORED IN EUROPE, THE MAJORITY OF THEM IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. CONCURRENTLY, THERE ARE FORCE UNITS OF VARIOUS STATES DEPLOYED IN THAT AREA, WHICH HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL THE NECESSARY CARRIERS, LAUNCHERS, AS WELL AS THE NECESSARY TRAINING FOR THE USE OF THESE ATOMIC ARMS. REACH AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF THESE WEAPONS REPRESENT A PERMANENT THREAT TO GDR TERRITORY AND TO THAT OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST STATES. PARTICULARLY CENTRAL EUROPE IS A VERY SENSITIVE AREA WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ATOMIC ARMS, INCLUDING THOSE OF TACTICAL MAGNITUDES. THIS CONCERN IS MAGNIFIED BY THE NECESSARILY DEVASTATING RESULTS THE USE OF NUCLEAR ARMS WOULD HAVE AMONG THE

CIVILIAN POPULATION.

11. IT IS BEING STRENGTHENED BY THE FACT THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONCEPTS HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY PRONOUNCED IN THE WEST, WHICH  
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PROVIDE FROM THE VERY FIRST FOR THE USE OF ATOMIC ARMS, AND FOR ESCALATION OF A NUCLEAR WAR. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS CONSTANT TALK IN WESTERN COUNTRIES ABOUT PLANS FOR THE INCREASE OF THE QUANTITY AND TYPES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. THUS THE INTENTION BY THE WESTERN PARTNERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO EXCLUDE AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS FROM THE INTENDED REDUCTIONS THEREFORE REINFORCES OUR CONCERN THAT THIS WILL BE USED TO KEEP OPEN THE OPTIONS TO INCREASE THE NUMBER AND THE REARMING OF THESE UNITS. THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE REDUCTION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES REPRESENTS A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT REDUCES THE DANGER OF A NUCLEAR WAR BY DIRECTLY LIMITING THE POTENTIAL FOR THE USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

12. ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, INCLUDING THOSE STATES WITH SPECIAL STATUS, ARE ENTITLED TO CLEAR ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY ALL POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS TO AN AGREEMENT, THAT THEY WILL MAKE THEIR INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THE PREAMBLE, AND PARTICULARLY ARTICLES 4 AND 5 OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES, CLEARLY CONSIDER THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE STATES WITH SPECIAL STATUS. THEY PROVIDE FOR THE REDUCTION OF FOREIGN FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND FOR THEIR RETURN TO NATIONAL TERRITORIES, AND FOR A DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL FORCES.

13. BY REDUCING THE FORCES OF THE 11 DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE - AND THAT INCLUDEDS ALL THE FORCE ELEMENTS - WE FULFILL THE AGREED AIM, ACCORDING TO THE WILL OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO MORE STABLE RELATIONS AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

14. TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, THE DELEGATION OF THE GDR WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS FOR ACHIEVING PRACTICAL RESULTS, WHICH WILL ENCOMPASS ALL ELEMENTS OF THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.  
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## Message Attributes

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